Introduction

Gender, Genealogy, Biopolitics

In *The Will to Knowledge,* the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault identified sexuality as one of the defining biopolitical technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Just as sexuality became the subject of scientific and biopolitical discourse in the nineteenth century, gender has become the major sexual discourse of the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Gender has occupied its place as the cultural nominator of sex for only a half a century, yet few in the English-speaking world will associate it with anything other than the sexual order of things. Etymologically, gender, originating from the Old French *gendre*, which is traceable to the Greek *genos*, has referred to kind, type, or sort. Before the 1950s, gender could be used to refer to various types, varieties, kinds, or modes of any sort of phenomena, sometimes sex, but not necessarily. Its only regular usage was in linguistics, where it was used to classify nouns as masculine, feminine, or neuter. At some point in the twentieth century, gender went from being a nominator of types and became bound to the sexual order of things.

As with sexuality in the Victorian period, over the last sixty years the notion of gender has become an entire field of knowledge and a discursive fact that is spoken about, theorized, and contentiously debated. Feminists famously took up the discourse in the 1970s to challenge biological determinism. The study of gender has been institutionalized in the academic discipline of Gender Studies. In government, "women" have been replaced

by "gender" in policy-making processes with the aim of introducing more comprehensive policies to advance equality between women and men. Gender has become commonplace to the extent that it is often a synonym for sex in everyday conversations and bureaucratic forms. It has become a key variable in social scientific surveys of different sociopolitical phenomena like voting, representation, employment, salaries, and parental leave decisions.

It seems that, to paraphrase Foucault, gender belongs to the twentieth century like fish to water—it could not have emerged anywhere else.[1] The very fact that gender is talked about as never before—what is it, is it significant, how does it affect this or that part of social, economic, and political life?—may well mean that gender, like sexuality, is a historically specific discourse of sex. If gender is a discursive event of sex, and if we accept Foucault's analysis of sexuality as an apparatus of biopower, then it follows that gender too should be submitted to a similar genealogical analysis that examines its entanglements in the same web of biopolitics in its own historical context.

Second-wave feminism, Simone de Beauvoir, Robert Stoller, and social theory have all been misattributed as the inventors of gender theory.[2] Its birth actually dates back to 1955 when psychiatrist John Money and his colleagues Joan and John Hampson at Johns Hopkins University published a series of articles on the psychosexual development of intersex patients. At the time, psychological sex, that is, a person's sense of being male or female was still believed to arise from biological variables, like the gonads or sex chromosomes. Money and his colleagues famously challenged this view and made the radical argument that psychological sex, renamed and retheorized as gender, was learned postnatally. Moreover, they claimed that it was such a strong determinant of role acquisition that it could even override biological variables of sex. The theory that biological and learned sex were not necessarily causally linked to each other was used to make sense of the sexual incongruities of the intersex subject, for example, to explain how an intersex person's sense of being male or female could contradict biological sex variables. Rather than challenging the sexual order of things with their new scientific arguments, however, the doctors' idea of gender was used to justify surgeries on children with ambiguous genitalia in the name of social health and order.[3] Gender was therefore invented as a mechanism for normalizing, disciplining, and governing sex.

As argued through the genealogy documented in this book, gender is an apparatus of biopower that emerged sixty years ago in the clinic and was instrumental to sedimenting Western postwar capitalism through

the management of sex. For feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, gender was a means of opposing biological determinism and its control over women's life-administering bodies and capacities. Gender theory was deployed concurrently by demographers and sociologists probing for explanations and solutions to declining fertility rates in Western Europe from the 1980s onward. In the 1990s, gender became an integral part of European Union (EU) public policy, aiming to optimize fertility through gender equality policy. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, gender was an identifiable phenomenon or discursive fact in science, politics, and government. It has been an instrument of biopower since its psychiatric birth, designed to uphold the Western capitalist social, political, and economic order through the socialization of individuals into different-sex desiring subjects who would reproduce capital and population.

The context of this book is therefore focused specifically on postwar Western capitalist biopolitics and the shift to neoliberal modes of governmentality from the 1980s onward. Indeed, nowhere has this deployment of gender culminated in the workings of biopolitical and neoliberal governmentality as it has in Western Europe today. In the 1990s and 2000s, gender equality made headway as a policy problem for governments of highly industrialized Western societies largely as a response to the economic threat posed by declining fertility rates (Duncan 2002; Stratigaki 2004). A projected shortage of human capital and taxpayers came to be seen as a threat to welfare systems and economic productivity. In the European Union, the "reconciliation of work and family life" has been advanced as a solution to the forecasted economic slowdown over the past two decades, often under the banner of gender equality. Gender equality policy and gender mainstreaming have emerged as significant biopolitical tools of neoliberal governmentality to enable women to work and reproduce, to produce capital and the workforce, thus filling a labor shortage gap, easing the pressure on welfare systems, and ensuring the existence of a future labor force. By governing gender as a critical nexus for population governance, the EU aims to optimize its economy by revitalizing and reorganizing the lives of its labor supply.

In feminist theory, gender is often held to represent a more sophisticated understanding of the world beyond crude biological sex. As Clare Hemmings (2011) has demonstrated, in feminist poststructuralism and queer theory, gender theory is frequently seen as a progressive, knowledgeable, and up-to-date theoretical development moving beyond the essentialist subject of "woman" in favor of multiplicity and performativity. At the same time, feminists recently have also expressed reservations about the way in which gender is being incorporated into government

policies. Not only are governmental gender equality policies criticized for using gender as a synonym for sex rather than as a tool of deconstruction, but feminists have also argued that their ideas are being appropriated to advance neoliberal goals, for example, through the aforementioned policies of gender mainstreaming (e.g., Eisenstein 2010; Squires 2007, 148; True 2003), which feminists argue reduce gender to one variable among many in the attempt to realize good governance (Butler and Weed 2011, 5; Woehl 2008). The neoliberal state stands accused of usurping feminist ideas, de-radicalizing them, and appropriating them to advance economic productivity, competitiveness, and efficiency.

While the way in which gender mainstreaming has been deployed certainly constitutes a neoliberalization of the gender discourse, arguments of usurpation run the risk of suggesting that a "good" feminist concept is being co-opted by "bad" neoliberal forces. Despite its polemical potential, such reasoning is in danger of assuming that gender has a conceptually pure form, that feminists are the custodians of its true meaning, and that it is now being stolen and corrupted by neoliberalism to serve capitalist economic policies. Although it is often mistakenly taken to be so, gender is in fact not the brainchild of feminism, but a biopolitical apparatus whose deployment precedes its use in feminist theory.

Gender is, and has been since its birth, unmistakably an arena of political struggle. For scientists, feminists, and governments alike, the question posed by the idea of gender revolved around the problem of how to govern sex. In the governmental adoption of gender discourse in the EU, for instance, gender equality policy is not only used to advance neoliberal goals—for example, by encouraging men and women to share domestic tasks to increase flexibility in the labor market—but also by attempting to induce women to reproduce the organic bodies that constitute the labor force while simultaneously becoming laboring bodies for capital production themselves. Gender equality policy, in this light, aims to govern the sexual subjectivities, bodies, behaviors, and practices that ensure the reproduction of labor and life.

The postwar invention of gender in the clinic to manage sexual socialization and its present governmental deployment to control demographic and economic processes are not unrelated. Both represent different disciplinary and tactical events in the genealogy of the deployment of gender. They provide an impetus to re-examine gender as a biopolitical apparatus. Foucault's achievement in *Will to Knowledge* was to genealogically disrupt the modern discourse of sexuality and unveil it as a technology of power fundamental to the operation of what he saw as the predominant modern mode of politics, biopolitics—politics "situated and exercised at the level

of life" (Foucault 1981, 137). What is ultimately at stake in a genealogy of gender is therefore not how one defines gender, how it works, or whether it is significant or permissible as a social or analytical category. A genealogy of gender asks how "to account for the fact that *it is spoken about*" (Foucault 1981, 11, emphasis added) and to uncover the technologies of knowledge and power that deploy and maintain it, through what strategies, and with what effects.

While this book can be seen in part as a continuation of Foucault's biopolitical genealogy of sexuality, it is also a critical intervention into feminist gender theory, questioning the feminist reliance on the discourse of gender and issuing a warning about its contingent nature as a concept for emancipatory struggles. Feminist engagements with the gender discourse may challenge biopower and biopolitical discourses, but their challenge is always a limited one. The debates over gender, even feminist ones, are necessarily entangled in the debate over how to govern sex, and therefore, in a precarious game of truth and life. In this sense, feminist gender theory is also a site of production, albeit a radicalized one, of the power-knowledge of gender and sex.

For feminist thinkers like Rosi Braidotti who never warmed to the notion, gender has long marked a "crisis point in feminist theory and practice" (1994, 150) as theoretically vague and politically ambivalent. A genealogy of gender tasks itself with instigating another sort of crisis of gender by suspending all theories of gender, "unlearning" (Rabinow 2009, 39) them and questioning the conditions of knowledge by which gender is produced as a discourse in the first place, starting with its birth in Johns Hopkins University in 1955, through its counter-deployment in feminist theory, to its present governmentalization in Europe. It asks how gender entered the realm of the sexual apparatus in the first place, what biopolitical strategic and tactical functions it performs. It shows how the idea of gender, underpinned by powerful theories of sex, behavior, psychology, social order, and power, has enabled the perpetual extension of the apparatus of sexuality into new fields of life, at the level of both the subject and society.

WHAT IS GENDER GENEALOGY?

Foucault radically challenged the popular understanding of sexuality at a time when sexuality had been long accepted as a discursive fact. He argued that it was not an identity or truth of the self but a biopolitical apparatus centered on the question of the management of life of the species.

Similarly, if we examine how gender arose as a discourse centered on the question of life, gender cannot be theorized as a representation of sex nor a cultural construct. It is not a product or effect of a structural system like patriarchy (Pateman 1988), capitalism (Bakker and Gill 2003), or the Oedipal family (Chodorow 1999; Gilligan 1982). Neither can it be treated as a representation of sex (Okin 1979; de Lauretis 1987), an effect of culture (Scott 1992), or a discursive or performative process (Butler 1999).[4] Rather, it must be figured as a historically specific technology of biopower. To examine gender genealogically it is necessary *to suspend all theories of gender*—including theories of its cultural construction—and examine *the conditions of possibility* that enabled its emergence. These, I argue, are fundamental prerequisites for engaging in such a genealogy.

As Lynne Huffer has recently suggested, readers of Foucault, including queer ones, seemed to have missed the importance of biopower in his genealogy of sexuality, especially the central point that sexuality is above all a question of "life-administering violence" (2010, 254). Indeed, for Judith Butler,[5] for instance, whose gender theory represents the most well-known Foucauldian and genealogical theory of gender, biopower is never the central mechanism governing gender (Repo 2014). While Butler recognizes that Foucault associates sexuality with "regulatory practice[s]," she argues that the Lacanian notion of prohibition "operates more forcefully and less contingently" (Butler 1999, 36) as the mechanism disciplining sex. By arguing thus, Butler's approach misses out on the strategies and tactics of biopower central to Foucault's account of sexuality. According to his analysis, what was at stake with sexuality was "the biological existence of a population" (Foucault 1981, 137) through the "administration of bodies and the management of life" (Foucault 1981, 140). Biopower, not law, was the force through which sexuality/sex became necessary as an apparatus of power. The eighteenth century was characterized by the event of "the entry of life into history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques" (Foucault 1981, 142). Sexuality in the West therefore emerged as a discourse of biopolitics targeted at making life live by calculating, ordering, rationalizing, and functionalizing the human body and population.

Butler's gender theory evades these questions of biopolitical strategies and tactics that are central to Foucault's analysis of the operation of the apparatus of sexuality/sex. Her view of power is strategically disinterested and contingent upon the rules of the dialectical production of meaning that serves to satisfy the subject's laborious desire for recognition (1999, 89; 1997b, 22). The power relations governing gender are

explained through the psychoanalytic structures of the incest taboo and the heterosexual matrix. The subjectivities they produce are in turn maintained through the processes of interpellation and performativity. A subject is not a subject and has no agency or claim to speak until it is invoked as a subject by the illocutionary power of language (Butler 1997b, 93, 112; Butler 1997a, 24–25). Instead of deploying the concept of biopower, Butler locates politics in the de-historicized realm of language as a predetermined set of rules that produces contextually determined subjective norms.

For Foucault, biopower is not reducible to the politically ambivalent dialectical rules of iteration and performativity. (Bio)power, as Foucault writes, is primarily strategic and the task of the critic is to question "what conjunction and what force relationship make their utilization necessary in a given episode of the various confrontations that occur" (Foucault 1981, 102). In other words, biopower is not a thing as such but a concept through which it is possible to interrogate the historically specific force relationships underpinning our political present. This reading of biopower sits uneasily with approaches that characterize biopower as a neutral force that can materialize as a deadly "thanatopolitics" on the one hand and "affirmative biopolitics" of resistance on the other (Esposito 2011; Hardt and Negri 2000). Nor can the nature of biopower be de-historicized and decontextualized from the political rationalities and technologies that become invested with it (Esposito 2008; Agamben 1998). In the case of sexuality, Foucault reminds us that "the deployment of sexuality has its *reason* for being . . . in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way" (Foucault 1981, 107, emphasis added). This strategic and material analysis of modern biopower has yet to be fully exploited in feminist theory.

Indeed, Butler's gender theory is not a genealogy of gender but rather, in her own words, "a genealogy of gender ontology" (Butler 1999, 43). She does not propose a genealogy of the gender discourse but a deconstruction of the acts and conditions that discipline the *appearance of something we call gender* as a phenomenon in different times and places in history. In her genealogy of gender ontology "gender is a way of 'existing' one's body" (Butler 1985, 510). The aim of genealogy for Butler is therefore to "map . . . out the political parameters of its construction in the mode of ontology" (Butler 1999, 43). Gender genealogy defined thus is an examination of the process by which one is recognized as being of a sex. Butler de-historicizes gender, lending it a phenomenological dimension as a form of existing in and experiencing the world, whereby we can discursively trace subjectivation as it

appears as different kinds of this or that form of identity, this or that mode of existing across space and time.

Butler's poststructuralist rereading of the sex/gender distinction, where sex is an effect of gender, gives the impression that sex has no genealogy of its own and is nothing other than an effect of gender norms. This theoretical rearrangement is not grounded in an analysis of the discourse of sex itself but a reversal of the sex/gender split that she critiques.[6] Unlike Foucault, for whom sex was an apparatus erected through a biopolitical urgency to govern populations, Butler's gender genealogy sidelines the question of biopower as the force behind the emergence of sex, whereby she must find an alternative means to account for sex. This she finds in Gayle Rubin's gender theory, adapting her insights on psychoanalysis and Claude Lévi-Strauss's theory of kinship to argue that the cultural configurations of the incest taboo form the structural conditions for the production of gender norms. Biopower is therefore replaced by kinship theory as the moderator of the machine of sex, and sex, reduced to an effect of gender, is removed from history.[7]

Some, however, have attempted to historicize sex through the use of gender. Historians of science, for example, have examined the historical emergence of the category of sex by using gender as an analytical tool. The critical necessity of gender as a tool of analysis, however, is questionable. Thomas Laqueur's significant study *Making Sex* (1990) skillfully demonstrates that the idea of two exclusive sexes only started to emerge as an organizing schema of sex in the eighteenth century as an effect of the development of the biological sciences. Yet, because he conducts his analysis through the sex/gender binary that assumes an ontological split between biology and culture, he ends up with an anachronistic use of biology, as a consequence of which the emergence of biology—and gender—as a specific historical event is lost in the analysis. For example, regarding the Ancient world, he writes that "biological sex, which we generally take to serve as the basis of gender, was just as much the domain of culture and meaning as was gender" (Laqueur 1990, 124). This argument is comprehensible only if we de-historicize biology, culture, sex, and gender as universally recognizable phenomena. Read thus, Laqueur means that in the Ancient world the ontology of the material body was as much a discursive construction then as it is today.

Yet, applying the relatively recent ideas of biology and gender to the past is genealogically problematic. As documented in *The Order of Things*, biology is a discourse specific to modernity that is preoccupied with the classification of living beings (Foucault 1994, 268). Given the historical specificity of the science of biology, one cannot do a history of this science

of life, or for that matter philology or political economy, in the Classical period, simply because they did not exist in the Ancient order of knowledge (Foucault 1994, 166). As Foucault observes, the biological "pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid for a previous period." If biology was not a familiar grid of intelligibility, it is because it did not exist as "life itself did not exist." Indeed, prior to modernity, "all that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by *natural history*" (Foucault 1994, 127–28, emphasis original). Therefore, just as we cannot speak of "production" prior to the existence of political economy as a rationale with its own inner coherence, in a Foucauldian genealogical analysis, we cannot speak of biology before the scientific invention of life.[8]

The advantage of employing gender for the critique of sex is of course its powerful ability to examine critically the truth claims of sexual difference in any time or place. Nonetheless, in a genealogical inquiry it is not enough to simply denaturalize and destabilize discourses. Neither is genealogy the methodological equivalent to a conceptual history as its aim is not to provide a history of "knowledge-contents" (Foucault 1991b, 79). Rather, the central aim of genealogy is to examine the *conditions of possibility* for the emergence, expansion, intensification, transformation, and destruction of discourses. These conditions of possibility are not the universal rules of language and interpellation, but the "complex histories of alliance, support, and reinforcement that facilitate the production of spaces of practical possibility" (Koopman 2013, 107). Gender emerged as a result of such force relations, which is why maintaining it as a tool of analysis would be to turn a blind eye to the power relations that constitute it. Yet, the workings of biopower underpinning the discourse of gender have passed undetected for some sixty years. As Foucault writes, we tolerate power only because it is able to hide its own mechanisms: "secrecy . . . is indispensable to its operation" (Foucault 1981, 86). In the same way, feminist theory has embraced the idea of gender because biopower has concealed itself from its deployment. It is these camouflaged power relations that deploy the discourse of gender that a genealogy of gender strives to unveil and critique.

Once we expose the power relations that condition the very possibility of gender, gender becomes a much more difficult idea for feminist theory. Gender has risen to such a prominent status in Anglo-American feminist theory and beyond as the central tool for critiquing truth claims of sex that some may find it difficult to conceive of how to carry out critical work without the concept. Yet, Foucault did not need the notion of gender to expose sex as a discourse of power, because for him

sex was not an effect of socioculturally constructed norms. Instead he examined the conditions of possibility—the rationalities, institutions, and practices—that enabled the emergence of the apparatus of sex. For Foucault, sexuality and sex are not cultural constructions, but "historical formations, positivities or empiricities" (Deleuze 2006, 41) or eventualizations of thought that organize and discipline, that "impose a particular mode of conduct on a particular human multiplicity" (Deleuze 2006, 29). Likewise, feminist thinkers must consider how gender, as a historical formation, institutes a reordering of things, behaviors, and subjects. The foundational assumption about the ontological status of gender as the construction of sexual difference diminishes the possibility of examining gender as an apparatus of biopower made possible through certain historical formations, and continues to conceal the entanglement of feminist theory with biopower.

Gender, therefore, cannot be made into the object of analysis as long as it operates as a tool of analysis. The first step toward a genealogy of gender is the unlearning of gender as a theory, social structure, or tool of critique. Just as Foucault did not provide us with a theory of sexuality to account for its emergence, there can be no "theory" of gender in a genealogy of gender. Rather, Foucault equips us with the tools for an *analytics* of power (Foucault 1981, 82). The concept of biopower permits the examination of gender genealogically by rendering gender the object of critique in the form of an apparatus of biopower.

BIOPOLITICAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE SEXUAL APPARATUS

Will to Knowledge is often read in feminist theory as a historical account of the discursive nature of sexuality, and is then used as a basis for arguing for the discursive nature of gender. In order to engage in a biopolitical genealogy of gender, it is necessary to return to Foucault's texts, not just the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* but also his other works. This includes Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France, which have been published and translated to English over the past decade. *The Society Must Be Defended* (2003c), *Security, Territory, Population* (2007a), and *Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) lectures in particular have provided political thinkers with an abundance of new concepts and insights with which to develop the analysis of biopolitical governmentality in the twentieth century. Such is the case here as well. Read in conjunction with, and in the context of, the biopolitical rationalities of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, demography, and race, the material and biopolitical aspects of the genealogy

of sexuality in *Will to Knowledge* become more vivid. In effect, the crucial importance of biopower to Foucault's account of sexuality, and hence, the present genealogy of gender, is highlighted for understanding the conditions of possibility for the deployment of sexuality.

Although there is some inconsistency to be noted in Foucault's use of the concepts of "biopower" and "biopolitics," "biopower" should be understood as a concept that can be used to analyze how a certain kind of force charged with regulating life operates to govern bodies and populations. "Biopolitics" in turn refers to a set of strategies, techniques, knowledges, and regulatory discourses deployed to regulate life (Foucault 1981, 139–40). Foucault traces its emergence in the shift from monarchical to liberal Western societies and how its workings have varied historically but also in different political regimes, such as Soviet or Nazi ones.[9] In the biopolitical era, political power is no longer preoccupied with exercising its deadly rights over legal subjects as it did in the era of sovereign power. Both the object and the subject of political power became the life of a population of living beings (Foucault 2007a, 11). The newly born human sciences conceived of man as a living being whose organic life processes were seen as related to economic growth and the state's prosperity. At the end of the eighteenth century, for example, numerous volumes were published on how to care for one's body, practice hygiene, raise healthy children, and improve longevity and human lineage. This also entailed the emergence of eugenic racism occupied with protecting and upholding racial purity and numbers. These developments entailed the "entry of life into history" (Foucault 1981, 141), that is, the introduction of biological phenomena of the human species into the sphere of the political through a radical epistemic shift in the order of social, political, and economic power-knowledge.

As Foucault argues in his lectures from 1977 to 1979, the birth of biopolitics was closely tied to the emergence of liberal forms and rationalities of government and the fear of socioeconomic crises. For Foucault, liberalism is not just an economic theory or political ideology, but "a specific art of governing human beings" (Lemke 2011, 45). The liberal credo radically redefined the object and mechanisms of governance through an engagement with the crucial question of why and how to govern rather than merely aiming to maximize state power. The result of this reversal of governmental discourse was what Foucault called "governmentality," describing the new rationale of the governance of governance. According to the logic of governmentality, government must no longer have a direct hold on things and people but can only intervene so long as the *interests* of a particular individual or population are at stake (Foucault 2008, 45). Government

concerned itself with the human being as a living being, in particular its economic, biological, and psychological well-being. Population as the collective species body emerged as both an idea and a reality, as an object and a subject, of biopower (Foucault 1981, 139; Foucault 2007a, 11). Government became tasked with managing populations as biological beings and their life processes in order to regulate an economically efficient and biologically re/productive and healthy population.

At the same time, the birth of new disciplines like demography began to treat the species population as a quantifiable and self-regulating whole that had specific economic effects. The life processes of population were for the first time explicitly linked to economic growth. As Foucault explains in the *Security, Territory, Population* lectures, the development of the new art of government was situated within a number of historical and material processes such as the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, which was related to the accumulation of capital and the expansion of agricultural and industrial production (Foucault 2007a, 103). Foucault argues in *Will to Knowledge* that the emergence of the bourgeois class through the rise of capitalism is the essential context for the invention of sexuality. Sexuality was invented for and by the bourgeois class, which invested it with value, surveyed it, and "devise[d] a rational technology of correction" (Foucault 1981, 120) for it. Only once the organization of the bourgeois family was accepted as an "indispensable instrument of political control and economic regulation" was it extended to morally subjugate and discipline the urban proletariat.

According to Foucault, disciplinary and normalizing society was "the historical outcome" of a liberal biopolitics that equated political existence with biological existence (Foucault 1981, 142). Political administration turned to ensuring the economic prosperity and the well-being of the population by rendering it an object of statistical analyses. To tap into its productive potential and control it required the rationalization of phenomena specific to population—for example, the monitoring of life processes such as fertility, mortality, marriage, health, life expectancy, migration, and illness—which were seen as variables affecting population and hence capital accumulation. The identification of points and processes of intervention was made possible by the development of statistics—the "science of the state" (Foucault 2007a, 101). The statistical quantification of these regularities made it possible for scientific and political authorities to scrutinize and regulate social, economic, and demographic trends deemed relevant for the economic management of population.

While on one level discipline was exerted on the capacities and life processes of the body, population as an economic and political problem also

demanded the creation of new institutions such as universities, schools, hospitals, prisons, barracks, and factories through which to discipline and normalize bodies. As Foucault shows in *Discipline and Punish*, the discipline practiced in these institutions on the one hand "increases the forces of the body" making it economically productive while on the other hand "diminishes these same forces" (Foucault 1991a, 138) by rendering the body docile and obedient. The material capacities of the body are therefore increased and then captured and directed away from the body into economic processes.

It is in this context of the governance of life that Foucault's genealogical account of sexuality must be understood in its full complexity and import. For Foucault, sexuality is "at the heart of this economic and political problem of population" (Foucault 1981, 25). It is a crucial pivot between the two crucial axes of biopower, linking the biopolitics of population to the anatamo-politics of the body, stabilizing the essential biopolitical bond between body and population. The target of the "anatamo-politics of the human body" (Foucault 1981, 139) is to maximize and utilize its capabilities, and discipline and integrate the body into a system of economic productivity. The "biopolitics of the population" refers to the regulatory controls that aim to adjust population to economic processes. The former technology operates at the micro-level, disciplining the fleshy, material species body, whereas the latter operates at the level of population and the management of demographic variables as resources for biological survival and economic growth. The discourse of sexuality brings together these two alignments of biopower, which together render sexuality "a means of access to *both* the life of the body and the life of the species" (Foucault 1981, 145–46, emphasis added), therefore both the organic subject and the population.

In terms of bio-economic utility, the sexual apparatus ensured both the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of capitalist production (reproduction of labor power) and the adjustment of population for economic purposes (management of labor power) (Foucault 2008, 14). Demographically, sexuality was crucial for the management of society—not only its size but also its well-being, in essence, its political, biological, and economic vitality. It enabled the control of both the body and the population as a whole, relying on a whole host of mechanisms for the state management of marriages, births, and life expectancies. The life function[10] of sexuality turned out to be "the source of an entire capital for the species to draw from" (Foucault 1981, 118). The growth of human population was correlated with the growth of production and financial profit. Sexuality made it possible to control forms of individual sexual behavior in order to make use of it socially, economically, and politically.

The discipline of intimate relationships through the family became a particularly valuable tactical component within the population for these purposes. It was no longer just a model for good government. It was made into a "privileged instrument for the government of population" (Foucault 2007a, 105). In *Will to Knowledge*, it is through the family that biopower was able to discipline the four figures of the deployment of sexuality in the Victorian era: the Malthusian couple, the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, and the perverse adult. The role of the family was to provide sexuality with permanent support that would ensure its productivity by accessing the physical and psychological capacities of its subjects. As Jacques Donzelot argues, the family is "saturat[ed] by hygienic, psychological, and pedagogical norms" (Donzelot 1979, 227) designed to socialize children into obedient, productive, healthy, and different-sex desiring adults. The emergence of psychoanalysis and its Oedipal framework in the late nineteenth century intensified the disciplinary power of the family, making it responsible for the adequate socialization of its members as appropriately sexed and sexual subjects of liberal biopolitics. The family was an instrument that ensured not only reproduction but also the control of sexual behavior through the psychological surveillance and discipline of its members.

The modern sexual division of labor was also instituted through the discourse of sexuality. As Ann Laura Stoler (1995) and Anne McClintock (1995) have argued, sexuality was about the cultivation of respectable, White, bourgeois bodies. The emergence of the idea of two sexes, the separation by species of man from woman, was accompanied by a corresponding split of public from private, domesticity from industry, market from family, man from woman. The cult of domesticity that began to form delegated bourgeois women to the realm of the de-politicized home where their duties were to reproduce and rear the next generation of labor power. The bourgeois woman was responsible for representing and maintaining healthy sexuality, for example, by upholding household arrangements "that came to discipline every aspect of daily life" that "needed constant and scrupulous policing" (McClintock 1995, 168), simultaneously rendering invisible the essential value of this domestic work for the capitalist order. Maintaining this order was the juxtapositioning of the White, middle-class "angel in the house" against the dangerous working classes and racially other colonial subjects. As Foucault argues, this organization of the family became "an indispensable instrument for the discipline and subjugation of the urban proletariat" (Foucault 1981, 122). Biopolitical discourses, regulations, and mechanisms enabled the exploitation of their labor, for example, as domestic servants, wet-nurses and nannies, and

producers of manufactured goods in order to both produce and uphold the domesticated, morally and physically clean, and reproductive female bourgeois subject and the politically rational and economically enterprising male subject that constituted the Malthusian couple—the re/productive promise of the biopolitical order.

Moreover, the enactment of the life function, that is, the "life-administering power" (Foucault 1981, 136) of sexuality, involved producing the disorderly, unhygienic, and faceless working-class subject that threatened order within the population as well as external racial others that threatened the purity and survival of the species. In the *Society Must be Defended* lectures, Foucault says that race carries out a "death-function" (Foucault 2003c, 258) that justifies the murderous agency of the state by identifying enemies of the race that must be excluded or even killed. Its most literal manifestation is found in totalitarian regimes such as the Nazi state, where racism was deployed not only to destroy non-Aryan races but also to "expose its own race to the absolute and universal threat of death" (Foucault 2003c, 259). In the liberal state, which is the terrain of this book, however, the death-function can be understood to encompass all forms of "indirect murder" (Foucault 2003c, 256), such as the exposure of someone to a greater risk of death, political death, expulsion, rejection, discrimination, and so on, that are enacted "precisely *so that* the racially privileged population can thrive" (Apostolidis 2011, 191). Race therefore justifies the death-function, enacted so that sexuality can target the privileged population with the life-function. This dynamic can be witnessed in present-day global care chains (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Peterson 2007), where female migrant workers take on the care work of middle-class women in the northern hemisphere, enabling them to participate in the labor force as "gender equal" subjects. The ability of northern, middle-class women to reproduce the species and produce capital at the same time is therefore made possible through the subjugation of women lower down in the race and class hierarchy. Race and sexuality therefore function along different but necessarily complementary tactical trajectories to ensure the life of the species population. Race delineates the operational terrain of sexuality by separating those who should reproduce from those who should not, and whose life can be suppressed in order to make that of the other thrive. For there is no species without race, and its population cannot survive without its reproduction.

This biopolitically focused rereading of Foucault's work on biopolitics and sexuality demonstrates how sexuality is not solely an effect of disinterested network power relations, but that there are significant historical conditions of possibility that account for its emergence as an apparatus of

power. Sexuality cannot be disentangled from liberal and biopolitical governmentalities that determine its objective: the social, political, and economic governance of life, and its targets, the bodies of living beings and populations. Sexuality is first and foremost a strategically configured apparatus of biopower targeted at life responding to major social, economic, and political upheavals culminating in the nineteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century it had become a crucial point of access for the discipline and reproduction of bodies and regulation of the life processes of population. It is through this strategic reading that the genealogy of the discourse of gender must also be addressed.

A BIOPOLITICAL GENEALOGY OF GENDER

Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose have argued that sexuality has been decoupled from its position as the axis between the anatamo-politics of the human body and the biopolitics of the population and that "reproduction itself has become the object of a series of forms of knowledge, technologies and political strategies that have little to do with sexuality" (2006, 208). Much feminist work on biopolitics certainly concentrates on reproductive technologies and biotechnology (Mills 2011; Franklin and Lock 2003; Waldby and Cooper 2008), but Rabinow and Rose's argument that this unseats the monarchy of sex is somewhat hasty. As this book demonstrates, there is little to suggest that the life-administering function of sexuality has been deposed. Rather, it has undergone significant reconfigurations since the Victorian period that have been overlooked by scholars of both biopolitics and gender theory.[11] The invention of gender in the mid-twentieth century split sex into the biological and the cultural, creating new theories of sexuality that completely reoriented the way in which biologists, psychiatrists, feminist activists and academics, demographers, sociologists, and public policymakers struggled over the domain of sex. It is only perhaps now in the twenty-first century, with the benefit of hindsight, that it is possible to trace the genealogy of gender; to understand how it complements, reconfigures, and revitalizes the apparatus of sexuality; and to understand the problems it poses for feminist gender theory.

In this book, gender is examined on a strategic level: it asks what force relationship made its deployment necessary, and what functions and effects of power and knowledge it ensures. How was gender deployed to support power relations? How did it challenge and alter the discourse of sexuality, through what reversals of discourse and mobilizations of biopower? From the 1950s onward, gender became an area of investigation in

increasingly numerous fields and therefore a focal point of a complex set of power relations and fields of knowledge capable of investing in it. This book studies how the interplay of these relations and discursive elements led to the entrance of gender into the field of thought and domain of action. The genealogy of gender interrogates the multiple and complex conditions through which gender was problematized and ultimately, how it became targeted at the discipline and regulation of life and its constituent relations and processes.

Even if we know that gender was conceived in 1950s psychiatry, it is not enough to merely ask how the idea was formed in science. It is also necessary to ask what were the rationalities underpinning its formation and at what kinds of social, political, and economic projects they were targeted through its use. The task of genealogy is to examine "the history of the way in which things become a problem" (Foucault 2007c, 141). Foucault did not leave his analysis of sexuality at the level of the discipline of subjectivity but tied it to the broader socioeconomic changes of the day such as industrialization, urbanization, population, and marketization. Sexuality became regarded as a problem that affected each of these areas of biopolitical governmentality and hence was deployed as an instrument with which to regulate them. Likewise, in a biopolitical analysis, gender must be scrutinized as an apparatus that has "a dominant strategic function" in that it "at a certain historical moment has the major function of responding to an urgency" (Foucault 2001b, 299). The strategic model of inquiry into gender therefore aims at exposing and analyzing the strategic configurations of the gender apparatus. How did gender order and link together various elements supporting and supported by types of knowledge that, through the manipulation of forces, were developed in a *particular direction*? How was gender deployed to enact the life-administering function of power through the urgent question of sex and life?

Much as Foucault's thesis on sexuality contradicted the prevailing belief that sexuality was repressed and therefore tightly controlled in the Victorian era, I locate the emergence of gender in a time and place often seen as sexually repressive. Contemporary television programs like *Mad Men* reproduce the image of the United States in the 1950s as a suffocating world of male-dominated workplaces and depressed suburban housewives. This may be, but it was also a period of explosion of new knowledge about society and the family that would spur a new discourse of sexuality, that is, gender. Most of the knowledge about society as a social system, the family as the core unit of socialization, the link between personality and social order, and theories of specific family relations such as attachment

theory emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. What these theories had in common was the view that the differentiation of personalities and sex roles in the family was seen as directly pertinent to the maintenance of social order. As in the Victorian period, this biopolitical shift was first instigated in the context of and targeted at the bourgeois family.

As Foucault and others have argued, in the beginning of the nineteenth century psychoanalysis began to rethink the family as a set of "psychological relations between mothers and fathers, parents and children, brothers and sisters" (Rose 1999, 157). Psychoanalysis made the "advanced liberal family" (Donzelot 1979, 226) responsible for the socialization of its members into appropriate sex-specific roles. The bourgeois nuclear family began to take shape in this period, but did not become the ideal model until the postwar era, when it was actively promoted by psychologists, educators, doctors, and politicians.

As in the case of the discourse of sexuality, the discourse of gender was also propelled into existence through a set of crises, this time in postwar American society. The family, commentators declared, was in decline. The success of the Fordist model of mass production meant that many of the needs previously met the by the family, such as clothing, food, and recreation, were being fulfilled by states and large businesses, as well as universities, churches, and professional associations. In addition, divorce rates were rising and the fertility rate was slowing down. For the prominent new functionalists like sociologists Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (1956), however, these were merely symptoms of a larger demographic transition toward a more advanced society. They claimed that in fact Americans were marrying on an unprecedented scale, and that divorce rates resulting from the shock of change had now slowed down. Likewise, it was true that birth rates had fallen since the mid-1930s, but a major baby boom had begun in the early 1940s that had now plateaued and stabilized. American society, they claimed, was merely transitioning from a high birth and death rate society to a low birth and death rate society owing to the increase in standards of living, which had reduced family sizes while increasing the life expectancy of its members. Increased prosperity meant that families could become economically independent from the extended family, whereupon they took up residence in new, separate suburban homes of their own built in the housing boom of the forties and fifties. Modern transportation made it possible to commute between the suburban home and the urban workplace, contributing further to the isolation of the nuclear family.

Rather than seeing this newly dominant mode of family life as a sign of the decline of the family as some did, Parsons and Bales argued that it was

a sign of progress. Different kinship and family systems had different functions, and "in the more advanced societies" (Parsons and Bales 1956, 9) the nuclear family constituted a part of a new stage of human economic and social development. If previous models of family were in decline, it was only because the family had become "a more specialized agency than before" (Parsons and Bales 1956, 9). Drawing on psychoanalytic theory about personality formation, Parsons argued that without the early discipline it provided children, "a functioning social system would not be possible" (Parsons 1951, 33). As a nuclear family, the family could now focus on its true and most significant function, that of socializing children to conform to the social order by ensuring that daughters were socialized into female roles and that sons were socialized into male roles.

The sexually stratified nuclear family therefore became the self-evident form of family that ensured a functioning and reproduction of the postwar capitalist social system. This differed from the bourgeois family described by Foucault in that the ideal family was now theorized exclusively according to the matrix of two parents, one female, one male, and two children, one female, one male. It also represented a biopolitical evolution of Freud's theory of psychosexual differentiation by linking the question of personality development to the level of population. The psychological processes taking place within the nuclear family became central to the maintenance of a certain Fordist postwar social structure.

The invention of gender linked this new technology of social control with the sexual apparatus. In *Will to Knowledge*, Foucault (1981, 63–64) highlights the emergence of sexologists in the fields of medicine, psychiatry, and pedagogy responsible for the proliferation of discourse and power around the sexual apparatus in the Victorian period. The importance of these fields prevails with the birth of gender. In 1955, US psychiatrist and sexologist John Money problematized the ambiguous genitalia of hermaphroditic children. A former student of Parsons and a follower of behaviorism, Money worried that the familial socialization processes of hermaphroditic infants were in danger of being distorted by the lack of appropriate genital stimuli. The first chapter of this book documents and critically analyzes the biopolitical birth of the modern gender discourse in this context. It begins by characterizing the biopolitical rationality of the first half of the twentieth century in terms of a shift from eugenic social engineering to sociological and psychological theories of social order. Through a reading of mid-century sexological studies against the background of structural functionalist and behaviorist theories of social order, the chapter shows how Money's invention of gender sought to discipline the reproduction of life in new ways. By the 1950s, five biological variables

of sex already existed, and so determining the true sex of a person with ambiguous genitalia was increasingly difficult. Owing to the rise of behaviorist theories of socialization in the early twentieth century, a new theory of psychosexual differentiation emerged that distinguished between biological and psychological variables of sex. Money's innovation was to argue that psychological sex was not biologically innate but was learned postnatally. The truth of sex therefore was no longer found in the genitals or the mind, but in the contingent cognitive processes of a behavioral control system. The chapter shows how the gender apparatus produced systematized protocols for sex reassignment surgeries for infants with ambiguous genitalia and solidified the family as a panoptic institution. The chapter argues that gender originated as a new life-administering technology that did not replace but operated alongside the apparatus of sexuality as described by Foucault.

Sexologists continued to be the pioneers in gender theory into the 1960s. Chapter 2 shows how the work of Robert J. Stoller, a prominent psychoanalyst in the 1960s studying transsexuality and transvestism, developed further the idea of gender and propelled it into broader scientific and popular use. While Money was concerned with the psychosexual socialization of children with ambiguous genitalia, Stoller's patients were adults whose psychological sex ("gender") differed from their otherwise coherent biological sex. Stoller's work developed the gender apparatus in three ways. First, it tied gender to the psychoanalytic discipline of desire that was already brought to bear on sexuality. Gender was therefore added to the continuum of the sexual apparatus while intensifying its capitalization of the family by making it responsible for gender socialization. Second, Stoller's studies refined the technology of gender by placing it in explicit structural opposition to sex in correspondence with the biology/culture split. Drawing on Haraway's critique of the biology/culture split as a control mechanism, I argue that gender was refined as a tool for managing bourgeois sex and life. In other words, this split provided biopower with an apparatus for the control of sex through the manipulation of sociocultural configurations. Third, the idea of "gender identity" introduced by Stoller deepened the confessional and self-disciplinary aspect of gender, not only on the male (trans)sexual subject but especially on the mothers who were held responsible for psychologically damaging their sons' sexuality.

Because Stoller's patients were largely members of the White, suburban middle class, the final part of the chapter puts the analysis in the context of the professionalization and popularization of postwar psychoanalysis. Leaning not only on Foucault's but also Deleuze and Guattari's and Adorno's

critiques of postwar psychoanalysis, I examine the sex/gender split in the context of the increasing depoliticization and objectification of psychological illnesses and their combined attempt to recalibrate the individual to readapt to social imperatives. This psychoanalytic discipline is tied to a US postwar biopolitics of race and class that underpinned the White suburban family ideal. The sex/gender split was a significant part of reining in the nuclear family, controlling its circulation of desire, and systematizing the logic of postwar biopolitical governmentality.

In Chapter 3, the book turns its attention to theorization of gender in Anglo-American feminist theory in the 1970s. Engaging with key texts of feminist gender theorists such as Kate Millett, Germaine Greer, Ann Oakely, Gayle Rubin, and Nancy Chodorow, the chapter examines the different ways in which the discourse of gender was deployed by Western second-wave feminism. It pays particular attention to the references to Money's and Stoller's work found in these writings, and how each thinker used, altered, and remobilized the gender discourse for use in feminist theory and politics by developing the powerful potential of the sex/gender apparatus in conjunction with vigorous critiques of psychoanalysis, capitalism, and reproductive politics. Anglo-American feminists of this period are argued to have a diverse and complex relationship with the biopolitical: feminist theory further entrenched the rationalities embedded in functionalist and psychological disciplinary mechanisms while reversing their political objectives. The final part of the chapter considers the extent to which feminists became unwitting interlocutors or critics of biopower.

Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of gender became increasingly commonplace in the social sciences and society at large. Chapter 4 analyzes the emergence of the debates over Western fertility rates from the postwar period and how gender came to be deployed by demographic and social scientists as an instrument for reoptimizing fertility from the 1980s onward, explicitly rendering gender a crucial mechanism for controlling population. Demographers had begun to be concerned with projections of declining fertility in Western Europe already in the 1960s and concurrently revised theories of demographic transition to take into account their predictions. From the late 1970s onward, the elements of population, fertility, and life were explicitly tied to the idea of gender. Demographers, newly concerned with the threat of declining fertility in Western Europe, saw useful value in what was seen as the "feminist" idea of gender, believing it might not only explain declining fertility but also how gender equality might constitute a solution to the forecasted population decline threatening Western economies. Demographers and sociologists saw gender as a flexible set of social norms through which

women's reproductive and productive labor could be reorganized, manipulated, and rendered more efficient. Gender therefore became a new significant apparatus in the biopolitical governmentality of population.

Chapter 5 analyzes how gender equality entered European public policy discourse in the 1990s and 2000s as a demographic, economic, and societal common good that would not only liberate women but also raise fertility rates and increase women's participation in the labor market. The chapter focuses particularly on EU gender equality policy, where gender equality and fertility are most intricately intertwined. I show how gender equality as a technology of biopolitical governmentality aims to manage women's work and family lives with the promise of increasing both women's fertility and their labor market participation—in other words, to simultaneously reproduce and produce the biopolitical. Moreover, I argue that the logic of governmentalized gender equality is infused with neoliberal human capital theory, around which gender equality policy is essentially organized by figuring gender as an "invisible hand." It aims to govern social relations, population, and economy by assuming that sexed neoliberal subjects make life choices based on investment, costs, and profit.

The sixth and final chapter assesses the challenges this biopolitical genealogy of gender poses for feminist theory and politics. I suggest that there is nothing inherently liberating about the gender term. As an apparatus, gender can be genealogically understood as an instrument of power deployable by different political strategies from biopolitical to feminist ones. Because gender is now celebrated by governments and international organizations as the solution to economic and demographic problems, I argue that feminists must reassess the importance of gender for making political interventions. Rather than undoing the power relations underpinning the discourse of sex, the biopolitics of gender reorganizes and reformulates the parameters of sex. By engaging in this discourse, and appealing to the state to correct the sexual order, feminism debilitates its own project by diluting its radical potential. The chapter therefore argues that, to an extent, feminism and liberalism are entangled in a common genealogy of biopower, and this must be taken into account if feminist politics is to create new concepts with which to challenge the conditions of sex and power in neoliberal modernity.

These chapters have the common aim of tracking and analyzing the biopolitical deployment of gender across the West from the second half of the twentieth century to the present. The breadth of the objects of the genealogy spans psychiatry, sexology, sociology, feminist theory, demography, and policy documents, and is indicative of the expansive deployment of gender in a number of fields central to the power-knowledge

apparatuses of biopolitical governmentality. Some chapters focus more on the anatamo-politics of the body, such as Chapters 1 and 2, while Chapters 4 and 5 are more explicitly focused on the biopolitics of population. Chapters 3 and 6 are crucial chapters for analyzing and understanding the challenges to feminist theory and politics posed by a biopolitical genealogy of gender. This book is by no means the definitive genealogy of gender—merely "a" genealogy—since it cannot possibly do justice to the numerous and complex ways in which gender has been deployed to reproduce and manage human life in the past sixty years. The aim of this book is therefore simply to initiate a critical discussion of how gender entered this stage of historical processes and was brought to bear on the order of life, and to provide some initial responses to the political problems that such a genealogy raises.